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Article 
Binding Leviathan: Credible Commitment 
in an Authoritarian Regime 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr.† & Shitong Qiao†† 
 
  INTRODUCTION   
Suppose that you are the ambitious mayor of a mid-size 
Chinese city striving to win a promotion to a more prestigious 
position. You do not have a lot of time to make your mark. The 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will likely move you to a new 
and better post in three to four years—if it is going to promote 
you at all. You therefore need to make a splash quickly in a 
way that conforms to the CCP’s promotion criteria. Here comes 
the challenge: how can you assure prospective beneficiaries of 
your long-range plans that those plans will ever yield fruit? Af-
ter all, your successor would want to impress her superiors 
with her own projects, not stand in the shadow of your 
achievements. And, if you cannot give them such assurance, 
how can you induce them to make the investments you need to 
achieve your plans? 
This problem of credible commitment dogs every govern-
ment, whether democratic or authoritarian. Governments that 
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have sufficient power to begin a project can always change 
their minds but, paradoxically, their power to change their 
plans makes them less powerful.1 Omnipotence can be crip-
pling. If lenders cannot be assured that a current mayor’s suc-
cessors will repay loans, then they may charge him or her ex-
tortionate interest rates.2 If homebuyers suspect that a mayor’s 
touted plans to improve the schools, police, environment, or any 
other long-term project will be abandoned by her successor, 
they will discount their bids on the city’s land, reducing the 
capitalization of good government and discouraging the current 
mayor from even attempting such long-term improvements in 
the first place.3 The bankruptcies of Detroit and Puerto Rico 
are testaments to the potentially short-term horizons of elected 
politicians, even in constitutional democracies. 
Authoritarian bureaucracies, however, face special credible 
commitment problems that may further exacerbate the ability 
of local officials to pursue long-term goals. Fear that local offi-
cials will build up a local power base that could be used to rebel 
against the center has historically induced the leadership of 
China, Imperial and Communist alike, to transfer local officials 
 
 1. For a general account of the problem of credible commitment and sov-
ereign debt, see CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS 
DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009) (explaining how 
large-scale buildups of debt pose risks because they make an economy vulner-
able to crises of confidence, particularly when debt is short-term and needs to 
be constantly refinanced). For a general overview of the tension between dem-
ocratic accountability and credibility of governmental commitments, see PE-
TER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN: AND HOW IT CAN DO 
BETTER 182–90 (2014) (noting that the “demands of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability require government to respond to changed conditions . . . in 
ways that will impair its credibility”). For a theoretical examination of how 
democratic elections can increase the problem of credible commitment, see 
Steven A. Block & Paul M. Vaaler, The Price of Democracy: Sovereign Risk 
Ratings, Bond Spreads and Political Business Cycles in Developing Countries, 
23 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 917 (2004) (finding that agencies and bondholders 
view elections negatively, increasing the cost of capital to developing democra-
cies). For one empirical test of the effects of political structures on ability to 
make credible commitments to repay sovereign debt, see Michael Breen & Iain 
McMenamin, Political Institutions, Credible Commitment, and Sovereign Debt 
in Advanced Economies, 57 INT’L STUD. Q. 842 (2013) (arguing that power-
sharing and party system polarization have important effects on long-term in-
terest rates). The article then finds that, where collective responsibility is high 
and polarization is low, markets perceive more credible commitments on the 
part of sovereign debtors. 
 2. See Breen & McMenamin, supra note 1, at 843. 
 3. See PIERRE F. LANDRY, DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA: 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY’S CONTROL OF LOCAL ELITES IN THE POST-MAO ERA 
263 (2008). 
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among subnational jurisdictions.4 Such frequent transfers un-
dermine those officials’ capacity to make the credible commit-
ments that officials with stable tenure can make with ease. 
Robert Moses, a mid-level bureaucrat in a constitutional de-
mocracy, was a mighty power broker because he stuck to one 
city, New York, for his entire career.5 Ironically, a mayor in 
Communist China, albeit untrammeled by democratic elections 
or local rivals with formal powers to dismiss him or her, lacks 
the same tenure and, therefore, the same power.6  
Moreover, authoritarian regimes discourage the develop-
ment of institutions that are independent from the central and 
local governments and that might otherwise act as monitors 
and enforcers of long-term commitments.7 Consider, for in-
stance, the role of lenders as monitors of fiscal probity. By di-
viding powers over decisions such as debt repayment and the 
bailout of defaulting governments among rival institutions, lib-
eral democracies are able to make credible commitments to 
both hard budget constraints against the bailout of unlawfully 
profligate governments and the repayment of lawfully incurred 
debt.8 China’s state-controlled banks, by contrast, face constant 
political pressure to bail out failing state-owned enterprises 
and extend credit to dubious city projects, resulting in balloon-
ing municipal debt of dubious legality.9 Similarly, the power of 
homeowners in liberal democracies to elect local officials gives 
those officials a powerful weapon with which to entrench long-
term investments in education, land-use regulation, parks, or 
other municipal improvements, a weapon their counterparts in 
authoritarian regimes lack.10  
 
 4. See WILLIAM T. ROWE, CHINA’S LAST EMPIRE: THE GREAT QING 37–39 
(2012). 
 5. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE 
FALL OF NEW YORK (1974) (examining the creation and use of power in local 
and state politics, through the story of Moses’s use of unelected positions to 
radically reshape New York City). 
 6. See id. 
 7. Luo Dang Lun (罗党论) & She Guo Man (佘国满), Di Fang Guan Yuan 
Bing Geng yu Di Fang Zhai Fa Xing (地方官员变更与地方债发行) [Change of 
Local Officials and the Issuance of Local Debts], (经济研究) 6 ECON. RESEARCH 
J. 131. 
 8. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME 
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND 
LAND-USE POLICIES 39–72 (2005). 
 9. See Breen & McMenamin, supra note 1, at 843–84. 
 10. See FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 39–72 (2005). 
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In Part I, we describe the special problems for credible 
commitment posed by China’s cadre transfer policy and, more 
generally, the CCP’s distrust of divided power. Then, in Part II, 
we examine whether the country’s current housing and finan-
cial markets effectively discipline local politicians. Part III is 
devoted to an evaluation of the existing solutions that national 
authorities apply to local government debt, a typical symptom 
of the short-term behavior exhibited by local politicians. Final-
ly, Part IV proposes three new institutional solutions for resolv-
ing the credible commitment problem of China’s authoritarian 
regime. In the end, we conclude that there is no magical solu-
tion that can reassure stakeholders, such as lenders or home-
buyers, that an autocratic mayor will follow through on her 
promises. All of our proposed solutions, however, trade on the 
intuition that even modest institutional limits on power can 
mitigate the problem of powerlessness that is ironically created 
by authoritarian power.  
I.  THE PROBLEM OF CREDIBLE COMMITMENT   
The problem of credible commitment is usefully illustrated 
by the tales of two Chinese mayors, both of whom racked up 
immense amounts of municipal debt through socially dubious 
demolitions. As will become clear below, far from being particu-
larly pernicious, these mayors were actually admirable in 
terms of their activism and ambition. However, they were crip-
pled by poor incentives and bad institutions. Because they 
lacked mechanisms by which to entrench long-term governance 
reforms, they rationally cast their lot with debt accumulation 
and large-scale demolition rather than making slower, less-
visible improvements in local governance. 
A. A TALE OF TWO MAYORS 
Geng Yanbo was the mayor of Datong, a prefecture-level 
city in Shanxi province, from January 2008 to February 2013.11 
After becoming mayor of Datong, Geng demolished all contem-
porary buildings in the old city for the purpose of restoring its 
historical features, an urban development plan requiring the 
relocation of over 40,000 households to a new city to be con-
 
 11. Geng Yan Bo Shi Zhang Da Tong 5 Nian: Huan Jing Pai Ming Cuan 
Sheng 81 Wei GDP Xia Die 3 Wei (耿彦波市长大同5年：环境排名蹿升81位 GDP
下跌3位) [Mayor Yanbo Geng’s Five Years in Datong City: Environmental 
Ranking Jumped 81 Places While GDP Fell 3 Places], IFENG (凤凰网) (Feb. 28, 
2013), http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2013_02/28/22563990_0.shtml. 
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structed across the river12 and an investment totaling RMB 50 
billion.13 During Geng’s five-year term, the city’s land-sale rev-
enue totaled about RMB 25 billion.14 The mayor also received 
loans from two banks, the China Development Bank and Rural 
Development Bank, both of which were policy-based banks of-
fering RMB 14 billion in loans at relatively low interest rates 
for long terms.15 By 2012, Datong’s total debt stood at roughly 
RMB 20 billion, one billion more than its total revenue of RMB 
19 billion in that year.16 Although Geng’s energy and charisma 
might have led to a successful project, Geng did not stick 
around. He was promoted to mayor of Taiyuan, the capital city 
of Shanxi province, in February 2013.17 Suddenly, the clock 
stopped on Geng’s project: the new mayor of Datong was reluc-
tant to continue Geng’s plans.18 As a result, construction com-
panies received no further payments from the government, and 
numerous projects were suspended.19 
Although he is now in prison after being convicted of cor-
ruption, Qiu He is another legendary Chinese city leader who 
built a reputation on mammoth construction projects that did 
not outlast his tenure as mayor.20 As party secretary of Kun-
ming, the capital city of Yunnan province, from December 2007 
 
 12. Shu Taifeng (舒泰峰), Da Tong Zao Cheng zhi Shang: Ri Tou 5500 
Wan, Li Kai 1 Yue Zhao Bu Dao Hui Jia Lu (大同造城之殇：日投5500万 离家1
月找不到回家路) [The Ache of Datong’s Urban Construction: Daily Investment 
Costs 55 Million Unable To Find Home After a Month’s Leave], SOHU (搜狐网) 
(Sept. 24, 2013), http://business.sohu.com/20130924/n387104682.shtml. 
 13. Geng Yan Bo: Gui Liu Shi Zhang Bei Hou de Min Yi An Liu (耿彦波：
跪留市长背后的民意暗流) [Yanbo Geng: The Public Opinion Undercurrent Be-
hind the Scene of People’s Knelling for the Stay of Their Mayor], SOHU (搜狐网) 
(Feb. 21, 2017), http://news.sohu.com/s2013/newsmaker157. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Geng Yan Bo Shi Zhang Da Tong 5 Nian, supra note 11. 
 18. Wu Gang (武刚), Da Tong Bai Yi Zao Cheng Lan Wei: Cai Zheng Chi 
Jin Wai Di Da Gong Si Che Li (大同百亿造城烂尾：财政吃紧 外地大公司撤离) 
[Ten-Billion City-Making Project Going Nowhere: Fiscal Austerity and Big 
Companies Evacuating], ORIENTAL OUTLOOK WEEKLY (瞭望东方周刊) (Dec. 16, 
2013), http://news.ifeng.com/shendu/lwdfzk/detail_2013_12/16/32160228_ 
0.shtml. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Yun Nan Yuan Sheng Wei Shu Ji Qiu He Shou Hui 2000 Duo Wan 
Huo Xing 14 Nian 6 Ge Yue (云南原省委副书记仇和受贿2000多万 获刑14年6个
月) [The Previous Deputy Secretary of CPC Yunnan Provincial Committee He 
Qiu Was Found Bribe-taking for Over 20 Million and Was Sentenced for 14 
Years and 6 Months’ Imprisonment], CHINANEWS (中国新闻网) (Dec. 15, 2016), 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2016/12-15/8095143.shtml. 
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to November 2011, Qiu launched plans for a nine-line subway 
system that would require a RMB 300 billion investment.21 The 
massive size of this investment was puzzling in a city whose to-
tal revenue in 2009 stood at RMB 37.8 billion.22 To make up 
the revenue gap, the Kunming city government under Qiu’s 
leadership set up forty-eight finance platform corporations and 
provided government guarantees for them to borrow money 
from various financial institutions.23 For the subway construc-
tion, it signed credit agreements with the China Development 
Bank and Bank of China.24 Financial institutions are generally 
not particularly enthusiastic about subway construction be-
cause of the long time frame involved, but the Kunming city 
government’s guarantee was adequate assurance for these 
lenders. As with Geng’s project in Datong, Qiu’s huge invest-
ment in infrastructure also saw land-sale revenues rise rapidly. 
In 2011 alone, the city government’s land sale revenues totaled 
RMB 55.8 billion.25 Again, Qiu’s gamble might have paid off 
had he remained longer in Kunming. However, he was promot-
ed to vice governor of Yunnan in November 2011,26 and his suc-
cessor did not buy into his ideas about urban development.27 
Qiu’s legacy is numerous unfinished projects in Kunming and a 
huge amount of city government debt.28 
B. “TEA BECOMES COLD AFTER HE LEAVES”: CADRE TRANSFER 
POLICY AS AN OBSTACLE TO CREDIBLE COMMITMENT 
The short mayoral terms of Qiu and Geng are not excep-
tional. It is well-established practice for Chinese mayors and 
party secretaries to have short tenures in any single local gov-
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Song Jia Yan (宋佳燕), Kun Ming Fu Zhai Lu Chao 100% 3000 Yi Di 
Tie Xiang Mu Xi Gan Shi Nian Cai Zheng (昆明负债超100% 3000亿地铁项目吸
干十年财政) [Debt of Kunming City Surpasses 100% the 30 Billion Metro Pro-
gram Used up Ten Years’ Fiscal Revenue], SOHU (搜狐网) (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://business.sohu.com/20130812/n383914651.shtml. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. People’s Daily, supra note 20. 
 27. Yin Hongwei (尹鸿伟), Zi Liao: Kun Ming Gao Bie “Qiu He Shi Dai” Fa 
Zhan yu Wei Quan Shuang Xian Bing Xing (资料：昆明告别”仇和时代”发展
与维权双线并行) [Document: Kunming City Bids Farewell to the “Era of He 
Qiu” Development and Rights-Protection Walk in Parallel], IFENG (凤凰网) 
(Mar. 15, 2015), http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150315/43343686_0.shtml. 
 28. Id. 
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ernment.29 After proving themselves for a few years, the prin-
ciple of cadre transfer requires that the CCP transfer them to 
new assignments.30 Legally, local government leaders serve 
five-year terms, but in reality their rotation and promotion oc-
cur much more frequently.31 
The cadre transfer policy is by no means a recent innova-
tion. It is in fact the contemporary manifestation of an ancient 
method of insuring that local officials do not build up a local 
power base capable of resisting central government com-
mands.32 The rotations imposed by the Qing Dynasty system of 
bureaucratic assignments were strikingly similar to those cur-
rently imposed by the CCP. As William Rowe notes, “as every-
one knew, the throne was trading off independent initiative on 
the part of its officials for the sake of central control.”33  
Centuries later, that tradeoff remains the same. It is intui-
tively plausible that such rapid rotation results in cadres sys-
tematically undervaluing long-term investments, the ultimate 
value of which is difficult to ascertain at the time of invest-
ment. If cadres expect to be promoted in three to five years, 
then they may rationally opt for investments that produce 
smaller but more easily measured and immediate value for 
which they can take credit. Empirical research suggests that 
short terms for local leaders have a number of negative conse-
quences, and economists have found that enterprises postpone 
investments and banks are reluctant to loan money to local 
governments during a leadership turnover period.34 
C. DEBT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF SHORT-TERM BEHAVIOR 
Geng’s and Qiu’s leaving giant municipal debts for their 
successors is not atypical. The National People’s Congress 
(NPC) recently reported that “incurring debt often brings per-
formance credit to the current government while the obligation 
to pay is left to the next government or upper-level govern-
ment. This mismatch between the right to incur debt and the 
 
 29. See LANDRY, supra note 3, at 263 (2008). 
 30. Zheng Yong Nian (郑永年), Zhong Guo Di Fang Zheng Fu Zhi Li Wei 
Ji ji Qi Ti Zhi Gen Yuan (中国地方政府治理危机及其体制根源) [China’s Local 
Governance Crisis and Its Institutional Roots], LIAN HE ZAO BAO (联合早报) 
(Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.zaobao.com.sg/zopinions/views/story20161122 
-693309. 
 31. Id. 
 32. ROWE, supra note 4. 
 33. Id. at 39. 
 34. Lun & Man, supra note 7. 
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responsibility to pay leads to the weak consciousness of local 
government debt risk.”35 The NPC’s comprehensive 2015 report 
on local-government debt revealed that, at the end of 2014, a 
few local governments had already carried overdue debt for 
several consecutive years.36 Some local governments had even 
incurred new debt just to pay the interest on their old debt.37 A 
2014 audit of local governments found that more than 20% of 
recent loans had been used to pay older debts.38 The interest 
rates on local government debts are actually quite high, rang-
ing from 7% to 20%.39 “In general, local governments are pay-
ing interest rates that are 4–5 percentage points above the pre-
vailing treasury yield (about 3.5% on ten-year bonds) . . . .”40 
Short-term mayors’ inability to commit to completing long-term 
projects is probably a main reason for the high interest rates of 
local-government debt. 
The rapid expansion of local government debt is raising 
concerns over the possibility of a debt crisis in China.41 Alt-
hough scholars and policymakers have yet to reach consensus 
concerning the likelihood of such an event,42 it is clear that lo-
cal-government debt is a major challenge for China’s financial 
 
 35. Yi Xie Di Fang Zheng Fu Reng Ran Wei Gui Ju Zhai Shen Zhi Ju 
Zhai Fa Fang Yang Lao Jin (一些地方政府仍然违规举债，甚至举债发放养老金) 
[Some Local Governments Still Borrow Illegally, or Even Pay Pensions out of 
Such Illegal Borrowings], BEIJING NEWS (新京报) (Dec. 23, 2015), http://big5 
.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-12/23/c_ 
128557588.htm. 
 36. The Research Office of the Budgetary Affairs Comm. for the Nat’l 
People’s Cong. of the People’s Republic of China (全国人大常委会预算工作委员
会调研组), Guan Yu Gui Fan Di Fang Zheng Fu Zhai Wu Guan Li Gong Zuo 
Qing Kuang de Diao Yan Bao Gao (关于规范地方政府债务管理工作情况的报告), 
[The Report on the Work Progress Regarding the Regulation of Local Govern-
ment Debt Management], NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. (中国人大杂志) (2016), http:// 
www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zgrdzz/2016-03/29/content_1986294.htm. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Richard Dobbs, Susan Lund, Jonathan Woetzel & Mina Mutafchieva, 
Debt and (Not Much) Deleveraging 76, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., Feb. 2015, at 
76. 
 39. Yi Xie Di Fang Zheng Fu Reng Ran Wei Gui Ju Zhai Shen Zhi Ju 
Zhai Fa Fang Yang Lao Jin, supra note 35. 
 40. Xiaowei Huang, Chen Song & Yi David Wang, Does China’s Debt-for-
Bond Swap Reduce Banks’ Risk, CHINA INT’L CONF. IN FIN. 3 (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name= 
CICF2017&paper_id=329. 
 41. Richard Partington, China’s Credit Rating Cut to A+ by S&P Over Ris-
ing Debt Fears, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
business/2017/sep/21/sp-cuts-chinas-credit-rating-to-a-over-rising-debt-fears. 
 42. See Huang et al., supra note 40, at 2–3. 
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system.43 China’s rising debt and slowdown in economic growth 
prompted Moody’s Investors Service to downgrade the country’s 
credit rating in July 2017, cutting its long-term currency issuer 
rating to A1 from Aa3.44 The last time Moody’s cut China’s sov-
ereign rating was in 1989, when the country’s economic mo-
mentum was halted by the government’s violent reaction to the 
Tiananmen Square protests.45 Two months after Moody’s 
downgrade, and less than a month before the Communist Par-
ty’s Nineteenth Party Congress, Standard & Poor’s Global Rat-
ings followed suit by down-grading Chinese debt from AAA to 
A+ on September 21, 2017.46 
II.  DO MARKETS DISCIPLINE SHORT-TERM OFFICIALS?   
If the central government cannot monitor or discipline local 
governments effectively, can markets do so? Here, we examine 
whether the current housing and financial markets can effec-
tively discipline short-term officials. As explained below, Chi-
nese cities lack two mechanisms for making credible commit-
ments that American cities enjoy: home-owning residents’ 
electoral power and independent lenders’ financial incentives.47  
A. CAPITALIZATION, HOMEVOTERS, AND CREDIBLE 
COMMITMENT TO LOCAL AMENITIES 
If long-term and value-adding reforms could be reliably en-
trenched, then local officials would have powerful and immedi-
ate incentives to provide local amenities that are attractive to 
homebuyers, because such amenities increase local land values 
and thereby also increase the local governments’ revenues from 
selling ground leases.48 It is a familiar point that homebuyers 
are willing to pay more for houses located in jurisdictions with 
better schools, cleaner air, lower crime or other amenities com-
 
 43. See Partington, supra note 41. 
 44. Shen Hong, Moody’s Cuts Its China Rating for the First Time Since 
1989, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/moodys-cuts 
-its-china-rating-citing-risks-from-rising-debt-1495590160. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Partington, supra note 41. 
 47. See infra Parts II.A, II.B. 
 48. For a more complete explanation of the process by which capitaliza-
tion of local amenities into housing prices can give local officials revenue-based 
incentives to provide amenities that foot-voting citizens desire, see Roderick 
M. Hills, Jr. & Shitong Qiao, Voice and Exit as Accountability Mechanisms: 
Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese Communist Party?, 48 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 180–83 (2017). 
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pared to competing jurisdictions.49 By “capitalizing” such im-
provements into housing prices, markets increase the revenue 
of the local governments that are most successful in attracting 
homebuyers.50 To the extent that local officials are evaluated 
according to their ability to raise revenue, such capitalization 
gives local officials with short tenures an incentive to take the 
long view.51 
Capitalization, however, depends on local officials’ ability 
to make a credible commitment to prospective homebuyers that 
the reforms they value will be durable. Promises to create ex-
cellent schools, cleaner air, or an honest police force will in-
crease bids on lots only if those promises are believed.52 Ra-
tional bidders will reduce their bids on local real estate by the 
amount necessary to insure themselves against the risk that 
the mayor’s successors will renege on the promises (implied or 
express) he or she has made. 
William Fischel’s “homevoter hypothesis” shows how liber-
al democracies can address the problem of credible commitment 
through local elections that enable homebuyers to protect their 
investments at the ballot box.53 Once homebuyers invest in a 
community, they become what Fischel calls homevoters—that 
is, people whose undiversified investment in local real estate 
gives them powerful incentives to monitor local politics.54 
Homevoters’ incentives to closely monitor politics give them 
power over the local legislature, ensuring that individual legis-
lators pay close attention to the opinions of homeowners about 
developments in their neighborhoods.55 Knowing that their 
purchase of real estate gives them control over the local legisla-
ture sufficient to protect their investment from future changes 
in zoning or fiscal policy, American homebuyers are prepared to 
pay more for such amenities as restrictive zoning and good 
schools.56  
 
 49. See Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 1273, 1275 (2008). 
 50. See FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 39–71. 
 51. Hills & Qiao, supra note 48, at 185. 
 52. FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 49–51 (describing incomplete capitalization 
of temporary tax relief in land values in Massachusetts). 
 53. Id. at 74–97. 
 54. Id. at 72–97 (describing median voters’ control over local politics). 
 55. Id. at 96–97. 
 56. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable 
City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 91, 112–15 (2015). 
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Chinese officials, by contrast, have weak electoral mecha-
nisms for locking in value-enhancing programs, a weakness 
that limits homebuyers’ ability to reward local leaders who pro-
tect those programs. Although local people’s congresses at the 
level of urban district and town are directly elected, the rules 
for nominating candidates and norms for campaigning dampen 
the power of delegates to determine policy.57 In indirect elec-
tions, where directly elected local congresses select delegates 
for the level of government above them, party leaders rather 
than the local congress play the leading role in setting quotas 
for different social groups and choosing the delegation.58 The 
capacity for local landowners to control the congress, therefore, 
is limited: party leaders might decide to emphasize entirely dif-
ferent industries based on their own policy priorities.59 Mayors 
and party secretaries of cities are, in theory, selected by the lo-
cal congresses; but in reality, they are chosen by the party 
leadership of the next higher level of government, further 
weakening the capacity of the local congress to lock in reforms 
of an outgoing mayor.60 
Far from empowering mayors, this lack of an electoral con-
nection actually weakens them by depriving them of an im-
portant method of making credible commitments through an 
electoral coalition of program beneficiaries, which would bind 
their successors to respecting the incumbent’s programs. In the 
absence of such a tool, Chinese mayors rationally favor infra-
structure investments. Unlike investments in such long-term 
and intangible goods as administrative fairness and education-
al and environmental quality, investments in infrastructure 
provide quick and easily verifiable benefits to buyers. A road, 
once built, will always be there, whereas investments in schools 
 
 57. BARRETT L. MCCORMICK, POLITICAL REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA: 
DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY IN A LENINIST STATE 130–56 (1990) (describ-
ing local elections in the wake of the 1979 election law reform and noting vari-
ous Leninist impediments to local voters’ electing candidates independent 
from the local party secretary). 
 58. Ying Sun, Municipal People’s Congress Elections in the PRC: A Process 
of Co-Option, 23 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 183, 186–88 (2014) (describing process of 
delegate quota setting and selection of delegates). 
 59. Id. at 189 (quoting city party leaders who emphasized selection of 
members of “four pillar industries in our city, i.e. the high and new technology 
sector, the modern service industry, the finance business, and the cultural in-
dustry” as delegates). 
 60. LANDRY, supra note 3, at 80–115 (describing appointment process of 
mayors and party secretaries). 
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or a polite police force may well disappear once a mayor or par-
ty secretary has moved on to greener pastures. 
That local officials across China are ignoring what home-
buyers plainly want suggests that the incentives of the two par-
ties are not well aligned. One possible reason for this misa-
lignment is that local officials are not systematically evaluated 
on the basis of their comparative success in raising the aggre-
gate value of real estate within their jurisdictions.61 Another is 
that even if they were assessed on the basis of indicators keyed 
to real estate values, they have no mechanism by which to lock 
in reforms that promote such values over the long haul. 
B. INDEPENDENT LENDERS AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT TO 
HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
Might the lenders themselves be a force for reining in local 
borrowing? After all, most are themselves governmental offi-
cials running state-owned enterprises.62 Could bankers’ incen-
tives to win promotion induce them to play the heavy with 
wayward localities? 
State-owned banks, however, face the same credible com-
mitment problem as local officials: as noted below, the very 
omnipotence of the CCP undermines the reliability of bankers 
as CCP agents for fiscal discipline. The CEOs of state-owned 
banks move up the bureaucratic ladder like other officials, and 
their portfolios do not follow them to their next post.63 Accord-
ingly, if the loans they extend to mayors to cultivate political 
alliances turn out to be nonperforming, that is a problem for 
their successors, not for them.64 The leaders of some banks may 
 
 61. Id. at 114–15 (describing pros and cons associated with appointment 
process of local officials). 
 62. Ing. Jan Bejkovský, State Capitalism in China: The Case of the Bank-
ing Sector, PROC. OF THE INT’L ACAD. RES. CONF. ON SMALL & MEDIUM EN-
TERPRISES, at 7 (Aug. 2–4, 2016), http://globalbizresearch.org/IAR16_Vietnam_ 
Conference_2016_Aug/docs/doc/PDF/VS611.pdf (cataloguing different types of 
banks in China and concluding that “the vast majority of assets in China’s 
banking sector is under state control”). 
 63. For a survey of the rules governing the appointment and promotion of 
executives at state-owned banks, see Li-Wen Lin, Reforming China’s State-
Owned Enterprises: From Structure to People, 229 CHINA Q. 107 (2017). For 
the Chinese Communist Party rules on promotion of executives, see 
Dangzheng Lingdao Ganbu Xuanba Renyong Gongzuo Tiaoli (党政领导干部选
拔任用工作条例) [Rules on the Selection and Appointment of Party and Gov-
ernment Leaders] (Jan. 16, 2014), http://renshi.people.com.cn/n/2014/0116/ 
c139617-24132485.html. 
 64. We discuss the career incentives of Chinese officials infra in Part 
III.C. See also Hills & Qiao, supra note 48, at 178–79 (discussing how officials 
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enjoy the political clout to force a mayor to make a settle-
ment.65 For example, evidence suggests that local officials pay 
off loans from the politically weighty China Development Bank 
more quickly than those issued by commercial banks.66 Howev-
er, even the most powerful bank bosses lack strong incentives 
to limit loans to creditworthy municipalities, particularly as lo-
cal government balance sheets are hardly models of transpar-
ency.67 The actual track record of municipalities in racking up 
extraordinary levels of debt to build ghost cities and zombie 
firms provides an anecdotal illustration of bank-imposed disci-
pline being less than ideal.68 The recent wave of bank swaps of 
local government financing vehicle (LGFV) debt for municipal 
bonds suggests that bankers are relying on the central govern-
ment’s implicit guarantee of those bonds to improve bank port-
folios.69  
III.  EVALUATING CURRENT SOLUTIONS   
In the face of its emerging debt crisis, China’s national 
government has taken multiple measures to avoid it, including 
swapping mature debt for bonds to avoid debt default, signaling 
 
behave when they are evaluated on the basis of their jurisdiction’s GDP and 
revenue). 
 65. On the general tendency of state-owned banks to extend loans for rea-
sons other than the borrower ’s credit-worthiness, see Paolo Sapienza, The Ef-
fects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 357 (2004) 
(concluding from empirical analysis that “state-owned banks are a mechanism 
for supplying political patronage”). These general incentives of executives at 
state-owned banks seem to operate in China. See Minxin Pei, How Rotten Poli-
tics Feeds a Bad Loan Crunch in China, FIN. TIMES (May 7, 2006), http:// 
carnegieendowment.org/2006/05/07/how-rotten-politics-feeds-bad-loan-crunch 
-in-china-pub-18308 (summarizing survey evidence that bank executives at 
state-owned banks are not disciplined for their banks’ nonperforming loans). 
 66. See Haoyu Gao, Hong Ru, & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Subnational Debt 
of China: The Politics-Finance Nexus, (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2783125. 
 67. See Counting Ghosts: China Opens the Books of Its Big-Spending Lo-
cal Governments, ECONOMIST (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
china/21592628-china-opens-books-its-big-spending-local-governments 
-counting-ghosts (discussing challenges auditing local government debt). 
 68. For some of the numerous stories about Chinese cities’ investments in 
apparently non-productive physical infrastructure, see Frank Langfitt, Chi-
na’s White Elephants: Ghost Cities, Lonely Airports, Desolate Factories, NPR 
(Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/10/15/446297838/ 
chinas-white-elephants-ghost-cities-lonely-airports-desolate-factories. 
 69. See Shirley Yam, Chinese Banks Swap Transparency for Debt, S. CHI-
NA MORNING POST (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.scmp.com/business/banking 
-finance/article/1937649/chinese-banks-swap-transparency-debt. 
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a no-bailout principle, threatening to impose lifetime responsi-
bilities on local officials, and using local people’s congresses to 
supervise local governments’ borrowing and spending behav-
iors. After detailed examination we argue that the debt-bond 
swaps worsen the moral hazard of short-term behaviors, that 
the no-bailout principle does not really exist due to the system-
ic risk posed by local governments, and we point out the chal-
lenges to imposing lifetime responsibilities and empowering lo-
cal people’s congresses. 
A. DEBT-BOND SWAPS? 
High rates of local-government debt mean that debts are 
compounding at an alarming rate. To ease the repayment pres-
sure on local governments and reduce the risk of default, the 
national government introduced a bond-for-debt swap program 
for local-government debt in March 2015.70 After the initial 
RMB 1 trillion target set in March had been reached, a second 
swap in the same amount was launched in June of the same 
year.71 The program was then further expanded to reach RMB 
3.2 trillion in August, and is slated to total RMB 15 trillion by 
2018.72 The goal of the debt-for-bond swap program is to lower 
debt-servicing costs and extend maturities by converting short-
term, high-interest bank loans into low-interest, long-term mu-
nicipal bonds.73 
The debt-bond swap, however, is impeded by the same 
problems of credible commitment plaguing municipal govern-
ments. Put simply, leaders of state-owned banks, like leaders of 
cities, have institutional incentives to favor short-term benefits 
over long-term health of their banks’ balance sheets.74 The in-
terest rate for local government debt stands above 7%, whereas 
the swap program extends that debt into the future with inter-
est rates under 4%.75 Because the leaders of state-owned banks 
are evaluated by their banks’ profits and balance sheets, the 
 
 70. See Gabriel Wildau, China Imposes $160bn Municipal-Bonds-for-Debt 
Swap, CNBC (May 13, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/13/china-imposes 
-160bn-municipal-bonds-for-debt-swap.html. 
 71. China Expands Debt-for-Bond Swap Plan to 3.2 Trillion Yuan: 
Xinhua, CNBC (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/27/china 
-expands-debt-for-bond-swap-plan-to-32-trillion-yuan-xinhua.html. 
 72. Id.; see also Huang et al., supra note 40, at 3. 
 73. See supra note 71. 
 74. See JAMES STENT, CHINA’S BANKING TRANSFORMATION: THE UNTOLD 
STORY (2017). 
 75. Huang et al., supra note 40, at 3. 
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potential loss of interest would impose an immediate loss dur-
ing the current leaders’ tenure.76 As the swap program priori-
tizes debts that have already matured or will mature in the 
current fiscal year, some banks have voluntarily extended the 
repayment deadline to keep interest rates high rather than 
swapping local-government debts for bonds.77 In one case, a 
state-owned bank offered a LGFV a high-interest loan to pay 
off matured debt, encouraging the LGFV to avoid the swap to 
protect future cooperation with the bank.78 In short, the leaders 
of state-owned banks pass off bad municipal debt to their suc-
cessors—just like local government leaders.79  
Credible commitment issues impede the debt-bond swap in 
a second sense. Precisely because the risk of excessive munici-
pal debt is systemic in nature, state-owned bank leaders do not 
believe the national government will allow it to happen.80 Hop-
ing for an eventual bailout of excessively indebted local gov-
ernments, creditors blithely accept municipal debt to avoid the 
immediate costs of lower interest rates.81 This mindset has re-
sulted in two publicly reported cases in which swap plans were 
canceled under investor pressure.82 As one NPC report points 
out: “According to our investigation, because most swapped 
debt will not be repaid in five years, some local governments 
has no immediate pressure anymore and want to swap all their 
existing debt. They even think that local debt is not a problem 
anymore.”83 
 
 76. See STENT, supra note 74. 
 77. Zhong Yuan (钟源), Zhao Jing (赵婧), Zhi Huan Zhai Gui Mo Pan 
Sheng Yin Hang He Di Fang Zheng Fu Bo Yi Jiang Sheng Ji (置换债规模攀升 
银行和地方政府博弈将升级) [As the Scale of Swept Debts Increases, the Game 
Between Banks and Local Governments Will Escalate], PEOPLE.CN (人民网) 
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://money.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0202/c42877-28102860 
.html. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Peter S. Jeffrey, The Chinese Municipal Debt Crisis and Central 
Government Response (Dec. 17, 2015) (unpublished thesis, University of 
Pennsylvania) (on file with Penn Libraries Social Impact Research Experience, 
University of Pennsylvania) (noting that current levels of local government 
debt are unsustainable, and the national government may need to bailout the 
local governments to maintain current levels of development). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Cheng Tou Zhai Fa Zhan Li Shi Zhuan Ti Yan Jiu (城投债发展历史专
题研究) [Research on the Development History of Urban Investment 
Bonds], JRJ (金融界) (Jun. 9, 2017), http://bond.jrj.com.cn/2017/06/ 
09081922590656.shtml. 
 83. Committee of Budget Affairs of the National People’s Congress Stand-
 1606 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1591 
 
To conclude, the debt-bond swaps imposed by the central 
government are not particularly welcome by investors who rely 
on the central government’s implicit guarantee of local debt, 
and more importantly, they worsen the moral hazard of short-
term local government officials rather than solving it. 
B. NO-BAILOUT PRINCIPLE? 
In theory, because the Party controls the tenure of local of-
ficials,84 the CCP’s omnipotent leadership could forbid local of-
ficials from incurring too much debt. Indeed, as a matter of le-
gal theory, local governments lack the power to incur bonded 
indebtedness.85 As early as 2014, the national government in-
stituted the principle of no bailouts in dealing with local gov-
ernment debt.86 
This theoretical power to curb debt, however, is weakened 
by the absence of a mechanism through which the central gov-
ernment can make credible commitments to enforce hard budg-
et constraints against local officials. Chinese cities (like Ameri-
can cities87) can evade formal legal limits on city debt through 
the establishment of LGFVs—separate corporations that are 
 
ing Committee (全国人民代表大会常务委员会预算工作委员会), Quan Guo Ren 
Da Di Fang Zhai Diao Yan Bao Gao Shi Da Wen Ti Qiao Xiang Zhai Wu Jing 
Zhong (全国人大地方债调研报告 十大问题敲响债务警钟) [National People’s 
Congress Local Debt Research Report’s Top Ten Questions Raise the Debt 
Alarm], SINA (新浪网) (Dec. 26, 2015), http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/bond/ 
market/2015-12-26/doc-ifxmxxsp7010714.shtml. 
 84. See generally LANDRY, supra note 3 (exploring how the CCP manages 
local officials in order to meet its goals). 
 85. Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Yu Suan Fa (中华人民共和国预算法) 
[Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Order No. 21 
of the President of the People’s Republic of China on Mar. 22, 1994, effective 
Jan. 1, 1995), art. 28, translated in 1994 P.R.C. Laws; Huang et al., supra note 
40, at 6–7. For an exploration of the ambiguities in these limits on the power 
to incur debt, see Donald Clarke & Fang Lu, The Law of China’s Local Gov-
ernment Debt Crisis: Local Government Financing Vehicles and Their Bonds 
7–15 (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law Research, Paper No. 2016-31, 
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2821331 (describing legally ambiguous re-
strictions on local governments’ issuing debt and creation of LGFVs to circum-
vent these restrictions). 
 86. The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Guo Wu Yuan 
Guan Yu Jia Qiang Di Fang Zheng Fu Xing Zhai Wu Guan Li de Yi Jian (国务
院关于加强地方政府性债务管理的意见) [The State Council’s Opinions on 
Strengthening the Management of Local Government Debt], GOV.CN (中华人民
共和国中央人民政府网站) (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/ 
2014-10/02/content_9111.htm. 
 87. LYNN A. BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 
618 (4th ed. 2010) (describing techniques for avoiding debt limits including the 
creation of special authorities with separate debt-issuing capacity). 
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not formally part of the local government itself—which then 
borrow money secured by real estate turned over to them.88 
In theory, the central government could force lenders who 
make risky loans to LGFVs to internalize the risk by commit-
ting to not bailing out lenders or LGFVs that get in over their 
heads. In practice, however, lenders might not regard such a 
commitment as credible. 
The central government’s actual “no-bailout principle” 
turned out to be precisely such a weak and noncredible con-
straint. On investigation, it actually allowed bailouts.89 Lower-
level governments can still apply for financial assistance from 
upper-level governments in the event of a debt crisis.90 In the 
highest-level crises, such as a situation in which a provincial-
level government defaults on its debt or more than fifteen per-
cent of the cities in a province default on their debt, the provin-
cial-level government is obligated to report to the Ministry of 
Finance, and the State Council can decide to transfer money to 
that government to make debt payments and to set up a work-
ing group to supervise and coordinate all crisis-related work.91 
In short, local governments are simply too big to fail. If a 
provincial government or the national government decided not 
to take any measure to contain the crisis and spread of panic, 
the likely result would be systemic financial crisis.92 The na-
tional government simply cannot afford to take such a risk, 
which is why the aforementioned debt plan incorporates finan-
cial assistance measures despite the declaration of “no 
bailouts.”93 National or provincial financial assistance comes 
 
 88. See Clarke & Lu, supra note 85, at 13–29 (providing a detailed over-
view of LGFVs’ operation, liabilities, and monitoring by central government). 
 89. Wang Chang Yong (王常勇), Guo Wu Yuan Ding Gui Di Fang Zhai: 
Zhong Yang Tui Bu Jiu Zhu Yuan Ze (国务院定规地方债：中央推不救助原则) 
[The State Council Rules on Local Debt: The Central Government Introduces 
the Principle of Non-assistance], CAIXIN (财新网) (Oct. 2, 2014), http://economy 
.caixin.com/2014-10-02/100735206.html. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Guo Wu Yuan Ban Gong Ting Guan Yu Yin Fa Di Fang Zheng Fu 
Xing Zhai Wu Feng Xian Ying Ji Chu Zhi Yu An de Tong Zhi (国务院办公厅关
于印发地方政府性债务风险应急处置预案的通知) [Notice of the General Office of 
the State Council on Issuing the Emergency Response Plan for Local Govern-
ment Debt Risks], MINISTRY OF FIN. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zhengcefabu/201611/ 
t20161114_2457914.htm [hereinafter Ministry of Finance Notice]. 
 92. Wang, supra note 89. 
 93. For the challenges of imposing a hard budget constraint ex ante on 
local officials in China, see Jing Jin & Heng-fu Zou, Soft-Budget Constraints 
and Local Government in China, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE 
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with a catch: that is, the disciplining and punishment of local 
government leaders, who are thereafter disqualified from pro-
motion.94 The distant prospect of being punished for a later lo-
cal bankruptcy, however, is apparently an insufficient incentive 
for an official to avoid current debt,95 perhaps because that offi-
cial likely will not hold office in the bankrupt jurisdiction at the 
moment of systemic crisis. 
C. LIFETIME RESPONSIBILITY? 
How then can we change local officials’ incentives? Like 
politicians everywhere, Chinese officials care about their ca-
reers.96 In China, an authoritarian regime without democratic 
elections, the national government has implemented a cadre 
evaluation system based on GDP growth.97 The cadre evalua-
tion system, however, presents a dilemma: as criteria become 
more complex, local officials’ misreporting can defeat the cen-
tral government’s capacity to monitor whether the criteria have 
been satisfied.98 The central government’s evaluation of local 
debt poses precisely this dilemma of balancing accuracy of in-
 
CHALLENGE OF HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 289 (Jonathan Rodden, Gunnar 
S. Eskeland & Jennie Litvack eds., 2003). 
 94. See Ministry of Finance Notice, supra note 91 (detailing the proce-
dures available for holding local government officials accountable for manag-
ing provincial debt). 
 95. According to multiple sources, debt is growing rather than shrinking. 
See, e.g., Wu Hong Yu Ran (吴红毓然), Jin Rong Gong Zuo Hui Yi Ding Diao 
Di Fang Zhai Shou Ti Zhong Shen Wen Ze Zhi (金融工作会议定调地方债 首提
终身问责制) [The Financial Work Conference Sets Tone for Local Government 
Debts: First Time Mentioning Lifelong Accountability Institutions], CAIXIN (财
新网) (July 16, 2017), http://finance.caixin.com/2017-07-16/101116483.html. It 
now amounts to RMB 35 trillion, far exceeding the RMB 16 trillion debt limit 
approved by the NPC Standing Committee. Dong Jing (董兢), Zhong Cai Ban 
Fu Zhu Ren: Xia Ban Nian Jiang Xian Zhi Di Fang Zhai Feng Xian (中财办副
主任：下半年将限制地方债风险) [Deputy Director of China Financial Affairs 
Office: Will Limit the Risk of Local Debt in the Second Half of the Year], 
CAIXIN (财新网) (July 27, 2017), http://finance.caixin.com/2017-07-27/ 
101122968.html. 
 96. Hills & Qiao, supra note 48, at 177–79 (discussing the use of promo-
tion as a feedback mechanism encouraging government officials to take certain 
actions). 
 97. Zong Wen (宗文), Gan Bu Bu Zuo Wei Ye Shi Yi Zhong Fu Bai (干部不
作为也是一种腐败) [Cadre Inaction Is Also a Kind of Corruption], PEOPLE.CN    
(人民网) (Feb. 2, 2010), http://fanfu.people.com.cn/GB/10913536.html. 
 98. See Hills & Qiao, supra note 48, at 168–71. For evidence of such local 
circumvention of the one-child policy through local misreporting of data, see 
JUAN CARLOS SUÁREZ SERRATO, XIAO YU WANG, & SHUANG ZHANG, THE ONE 
CHILD POLICY AND PROMOTION OF MAYORS IN CHINA (Feb. 3, 2016), https:// 
www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/pe_04_16_wang.pdf. 
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formation about true debt capacity with simplicity of measures 
sufficient to allow monitoring of that information. 
In the face of a burgeoning debt risk, the national govern-
ment decided as early as December 2013 to incorporate debt 
risk into the cadre evaluation system.99 Recently Chinese Pres-
ident Xi Jinping proposed lifetime responsibility as a way of 
constraining local officials’ short-term behavior.100 President 
Xi’s proposal mentioned lifetime responsibility and looking into 
responsibilities retrospectively. Lifetime responsibility differs 
from the no-bailout principle in terms of the underlying as-
sumption about the relationship between the national govern-
ment and local governments. In proposing the concept of life-
time responsibility, the national government is demonstrating 
that it is taking responsibility for disciplining local officials, 
which is consistent with China’s centralized regime.101 The 
proposal sends a clear signal to local officials that the national 
government is very serious about combating local government 
debt, and may well exert a major impact on their decisions.102 
The challenge lies, however, in implementing the proposal. 
Top-down evaluation systems pose a dilemma: central officials 
can evaluate local officials with simple criteria that are easy to 
verify but that ignore relevant aspects of local officials’ perfor-
mance, or they can use a comprehensive evaluation system re-
quiring information too difficult to collect and verify.103 As-
sessing the optimal level of local debt poses precisely this 
dilemma: despite worries about excessive debt, the central gov-
ernment still seeks to encourage a certain degree of economic 
development.104 It is difficult for the central government to tell 
where the ideal balance lies, and it is also difficult to establish 
whether a default on debt is the fault of an initial blame-
worthy decision to incur debt or later mismanagement of the 
 
 99. Di Yi Cai Jing (第一财经), Di Fang Zhai Feng Xian Fang Kong Sheng 
Ji: Wen Ze Shou Ti “Zhong Shen, Dao Cha” (地方债风险防控升级：问责首提”终
身、倒查”) [The Upgrade of Local Debt Risk Prevention and Control: The First 
Mention of “Lifelong Responsibility” and “Reversed Investigation”], CHINA.COM 
(中国网) (July 16, 2017), http://finance.china.com/news/11173316/20170716/ 
30973768.html. 
 100. Id.; Sidney Leng, Hold Local Governments Accountable for Their Debt, 
Chinese President Says, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 18, 2017), http://www 
.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2103008/hold-local-governments 
-accountable-their-debt-chinese-president. 
 101. See Di Yi, supra note 99. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 104. Zong, supra note 97. 
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debt-created asset.105 Without a simple metric balancing these 
rival values accurately, any lifetime-responsibility system will 
fail at selecting the right officials to reward and punish.106  
D. LOCAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESSES? 
Local legislatures are supposed to control the power of the 
purse, that is, local-government spending. Local governments 
are in charge of drafting their own budgets, which they then 
send to their Local People’s Congress (LPC) for review and ap-
proval.107 The review and approval process constitutes a short 
session during the annual meeting held by the local congress-
es.108 
In theory, the LPCs could have good incentives to curb ex-
cessive debt. Although LPCs differ from city councils in demo-
cratic countries, they constitute a collection of local elites, in-
cluding intellectual, economic, and political elites.109 
Government officials who are nearing retirement age and have 
no prospects of promotion often become members of the stand-
ing committees of LPCs.110 These local elites have both the mo-
tivation and expertise to contain the short-term behavior of lo-
cal administrative leaders. First, although they were not 
democratically elected, most are from the local area and have a 
long-term interest in sound local governance.111 They may be 
local college professors, investors, or, as noted, former senior 
 
 105. Hills & Qiao, supra note 48, at 166–71 (discussing the challenges of 
supervising local government officials). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See, e.g., Yang Huayun (杨华云) & Bao Zhen (鲍征), Ren Da Dai Biao 
Jian Yi She Yu Suan Xiu Zheng An Yi Cheng She Li Biao Jue Ji Zhi (人大代表
建议设预算修正案议程 设立表决机制) [People’s Congress Deputy Proposed 
Budget Amendment Agenda and To Set up a Voting System], QQ.COM (腾讯网) 
(Mar. 13, 2011), https://news.qq.com/a/20110313/000144.htm. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Zhao Xiao Li (赵晓力), Lun Quan Guo Ren Da Dai Biao de “Jing Ying” 
Gou Cheng yu Zhi Ben zhi Ce (论全国人大代表的”精英”构成与治本之策) [On the 
“Elite” Constitution of National People’s Congress Deputies and Its Fundamen-
tal Solutions], ZHONG WAI FA XUE (中外法学) (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www 
.cwzg.cn/theory/201609/31102.html. 
 110. Tian Bi Yao (田必耀), Jie Du Ren Da Dai Biao yu Tong Ji Ren Da 
Chang Wei Hui de Si Ge Fa Lu Guan Xi (解读人大代表与同级人大常委会的四个
法律关系) [To Interpret the Four Legal Relations Between People’s Congress 
Deputies and the Standing Committee of People’s Congress at the Respective 
Level], PEOPLE.CN (人民网) (Feb. 17, 2004), http://www.people.com.cn/GB/ 
14576/14841/2343959.html. 
 111. See Zhao, supra note 109. 
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government employees.112 They do not move as often as ambi-
tious mayors and thus have no motivation or appetite for capi-
tal projects that would burnish the mayor’s reputation at the 
expense of plunging the city into a debt crisis.113 Second, local 
elites have the local knowledge and expertise needed to super-
vise local governments.114 For example, standing committee 
members who previously worked for a long time in various gov-
ernment agencies understand how government works and pos-
sess the inside knowledge needed to supervise local government 
finances.115 What LPCs lack, however, is power.116 
In particular, land-sale revenues and the debts incurred by 
LGFVs are excluded even from this limited review process.117 
In other words, a large portion of local-government debt lies 
outside the review remit of LPCs.118 Accordingly, local govern-
 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. People’s congresses at the national and local levels used to be called 
rubber stamps. See The National People’s Congress: What Makes a Rubber 
Stamp?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 5, 2012), https://www.economist.com/blogs/ 
analects/2012/03/national-peoples-congress; see also Lucy Hornby, Inside Chi-
na’s National People’s Congress, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/c4eddaf6-e108-11e5-9217-6ae3733a2cd1?mhq5j=e7; Zhu Jian Zhang    
(朱建璋), Ren Da Cai Zheng Yu Suan Jian Du de Nan Dian ji Kun Jing (人大财
政预算监督的难点及困境) [Obstacles and Difficulties in the Supervision of the 
Fiscal Budget of the People’s Congress], PEOPLE.CN (人民网) (May 24, 2006), 
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40537/4398096.html. However there is evi-
dence that they have become more active in national and local politics. See 
Tomoki Kamo & Hiroki Takeuchi, Representation and Local People’s Congress-
es in China: A Case Study of the Yangzhou Municipal People’s Congress, 18 J. 
CHINESE POL. SCI. 41, 42 (2013); Rory Truex, Representation Within Bounds 
(2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University), http://www.rorytruex 
.com/s/rtruex-Writing-Sample-Dissertation-Chapters-1-4-7.pdf (analyzing orig-
inal data showing that local and national representatives are increasingly be-
ing held accountable by those they represent). Despite this increased activity, 
people’s congresses’ power in controlling the government’s budget is still quite 
weak. See generally SHUJIAN ZHANG, BUDGETARY SUPERVISION IN CHINA: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF PROVINCIAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS (2015) 
(providing analysis on LPCs and budgetary supervision). 
 117. Wang Wei Guo (王卫国) & Liu Jia (刘佳), Zhuan Jia Jian Yi Pei Zhi 
Zhuan Ren Shi Xian Ren Da Dui Zheng Fu Yu Suan Jue Suan Jing Chang 
Xing Jian Du (专家建议配置专人实现人大对政府预算决算经常性监督) [Experts 
Suggest Allocations of Specially-Assigned Person To Account for Regular Su-
pervisions on Government Budgets], IFENG (凤凰网) (Nov. 13, 2012), http:// 
news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/zhonggong18da/content-2/detail_2012_11/ 
13/19091066_0.shtml. 
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ments decide whether and how much to borrow with little pub-
lic input.119 
Granting LPCs greater power to supervise local-
government finances could well motivate local elites to utilize 
their local knowledge and expertise to check short-term gov-
ernment leaders, thereby serving as the national government’s 
ally in controlling local governments.120 The emergence of a po-
tential local-government debt crisis in the past five years has 
prompted calls for greater LPC power from LPC members,121 
the Ministry of Finance,122 and the NPC.123 As we explain be-
low,124 these proposals are promising, especially if they are tied 
to strengthening the representation of local real estate owners 
in LPCs. 
IV.  STEPS TOWARD AN INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION: 
PROMOTING FORESIGHT BY MAKING COMMITMENTS 
STICK   
The problems with the current proposals are not necessari-
ly insurmountable. Modest reforms might indeed improve local 
officials’ incentives to incur debt responsibly. Here, we propose 
several reforms that might plausibly promote such institutions. 
The proposals we offer are intended to be realistic by being 
compatible with China’s current system of one-party rule and 
democratic centralism. Assuming the existence of independent 
courts, municipal elections, and separate powers would be like 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Xu Jun Zuo (徐俊作), Na Ru Yu Suan Guan Li Shi Xing Gui Mo Kong 
Zhi Di Fang Zhai Jiao Ting “Pai Nao Dai Jie Qian” (纳入预算管理实行规模控
制 叫停 “拍脑袋借钱”) [Incorporate Budget Management To Implement Scale 
Control Stop “Borrowing out of Head-tapping”], PEOPLE.CN (人民网) (Jan. 12, 
2015), http://finance.people.com.cn/2015/0112/c1004-26365494.html. 
 121. Nan Fang Du Shi Bao (南方都市报), Guang Zhou Cheng Jian Fu Zhai 
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Included Under the Supervision of the People’s Congress], SINA (新浪网) (Jan. 
11, 2012), http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/dfjj/20120111/112411176981.shtml. 
 122. Xu, supra note 120. 
 123. The Research Office of the Budgetary Affairs Comm. for the Nat’l 
People’s Cong. of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 36; Xiaohui Liang 
(梁晓辉) & Haiyan Ma (马海燕), Lou Jiwei: Di Fang Zheng Fu Zhai Wu Qing 
Kuang Yao Ding Qi Xiang She Hui Gong Kai (楼继伟：地方政府债务情况要定期
向社会公开) [Jiwei Lou: Local Government Debts Should Be Made Public on a 
Regular Basis], CHINANEWS (中国新闻网) (June 29, 2016), http://www 
.chinanews.com/gn/2016/06-29/7922006.shtml. 
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assuming the proverbial ladder to escape from a pit. Instead, 
we suggest that buried within China’s actual political tradi-
tions and current system of government lie the resources nec-
essary to defeat the crippling effects of theoretical omnipotence. 
A. USING LAND VALUES AS A LAGGING INDICATOR OF LOCAL 
OFFICIALS’ PERFORMANCE 
To induce local governments to care about the future, per-
formance indicators that take the future into account would be 
helpful. Local officials are currently evaluated by a plethora of 
conflicting indicators of varying weight that are difficult to ag-
gregate and bear an uncertain relationship to the welfare of the 
people they govern.125 As we argued in a previous paper,126 cen-
tral party authorities could simplify their task if they focused 
on local real-estate values as the measure of local cadres’ per-
formance. By promoting cadres based on their success in rais-
ing real-estate values, the CCP would give local officials 
stronger incentives to advance social welfare to compete to at-
tract mobile homebuyers. Homebuyers, in turn, have powerful 
incentives to balance the rival benefits of different types of local 
amenities.127 Because homeowners’ bids on land take the likely 
net future value of those amenities into account, local officials 
who compete to increase land values relative to other jurisdic-
tions in the same metropolitan area would likely compete for 
the amenities most attractive to homebuyers.128 In effect, they 
would be competing to win “election” by foot-voting households. 
Evaluating local officials based on the comparative change in 
the value of the real estate within their jurisdictions would 
therefore focus their minds on the future via a metric suffi-
ciently complex to take into account the multiple ways in which 
a municipality can be well- or ill-governed yet simple enough to 
be read at a glance by their evaluators.129 Because the officials 
tasked with the general supervision of local governments with-
in a given metropolitan area are all subject to the same set of 
provincial and national laws, any differences in the real-estate 
 
 125. On the complexity of cadre evaluation systems that balance economic 
with social welfare indicators and local officials’ varied responses to such crite-
ria, see Cai (Vera) Zuo, Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of 
Political Incentives in China, 224 CHINA Q. 955 (2015). 
 126. See Hills & Qiao, supra note 48. 
 127. Id. at 180–83. 
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value changes in their respective jurisdictions could plausibly 
be tied to the policy choices of individual officials.130 
Real-estate values provide a solid basis for President Xi’s 
proposed system of lifetime responsibility.131 As we explained 
in more detail in our earlier article, we recommend that local 
officials be evaluated on the basis of their city’s real estate per-
formance over a multi-year average, including the years follow-
ing their move to a new jurisdiction. By holding officials ac-
countable for their past jurisdictions’ performance, such a 
system of rolling averages would insure that such officials do 
not hand off a soon-to-pop real estate bubble to their succes-
sors: a collapse in real-estate prices soon after an official’s de-
parture would thus mean the collapse of his or her career pro-
spects under our proposed system. Because our version of 
lifetime responsibility relies on a simple variable that neverthe-
less captures what homebuyers value most about local jurisdic-
tions, we avoid the dilemma of criteria too complex to allow 
comparisons among cadres or too simple to capture citizen wel-
fare. 
B. USING HOMEVOTERS AS LOCAL GOVERNMENT MONITORS 
To render LPCs more representative and more resistant to 
pressure from short-term mayors, we suggest expanding the 
presence of real-estate interests—that is, the real-estate indus-
try, related financial industry, and homeowner and condomini-
um associations—therein. The real estate and financial indus-
tries already have representatives in LPCs. Hence, the focus 
should be on incorporating more local homeowner representa-
tives. As previously discussed, once homebuyers invest in a 
community, their undiversified investment in local real estate 
gives them powerful incentives to monitor local politics.132 
Granting them due power and a voice in local governance could 
counteract and constrain local government leaders’ short-term 
behavior. Recent years have witnessed increasing numbers of 
protests by middle-income homeowners in China’s big cities.133 
These protests are often triggered by policies that jeopardize 
 
 130. Kevin E. Davis, Data and Decentralization: Measuring the Perfor-
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 131. Hills & Qiao, supra note 48 at 185–87. 
 132. See FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 72–97. 
 133. Zhengxu Wang, Long Sun, Liuqing Xu, & Dragan Pavlićević, Leader-
ship in China’s Urban Middle Class Protest: The Movement To Protect Home-
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property values, evidence that homeowners constitute a popu-
lation that is highly motivated to shape local governance.134 At 
the same time, they are usually not ideologically motivated and 
make no abstract political claims, rendering their petitions rel-
atively acceptable to the government.135 Adding homeowner 
representatives to LPCs would provide this population with an 
institutional channel for reflecting their concerns, thereby 
keeping them off the streets and, in turn, reducing the pressure 
on the government to maintain social stability through force. 
Expanding the power of LPCs is essential to balance local 
politicians’ short-term behavior with long-term localized inter-
ests. To achieve this purpose we need only rely on what is al-
ready in the Chinese constitution, according to which LPCs 
control their governments’ budgets.136 Such mechanisms would 
include giving LPCs more substantive power and resources in 
approving government budgets and monitoring their imple-
mentation. Precisely because the incentives of real-estate inter-
ests are narrow, adding homeowners to LPCs also does not 
threaten the CCP with multi-party democracy inconsistent 
with the principle of the Communist Party’s primacy. To the 
contrary, the inclusion of real-estate interests insures that 
LPCs will support the status quo by counteracting incoming 
party secretaries’ short-term behavior with long-term localized 
interests. While inclusion of other social groups in local politics 
is necessary to insure true democratic equality, focusing on 
owners of real estate is a necessary and politically safe first 
step.137 
C. EX-ANTE AND EX-POST RESTRICTIONS ON STATE-OWNED 
BANK LENDING TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
The institutional problem the central government con-
fronts with respect to state-owned banks is the mirror image of 
the problem faced by local governments: unable to credibly 
commit to refraining from bailing out defaulting cities and their 
lenders, the central government cannot control bank lending to 
those cities. A general solution must therefore address the 
 
 134. Id. at 420–21 (describing the views of prominent political activists in 
Beijing, including one leader who believed that policies were “based on the 
wrong values”).  
 135. Id. at 413 (explaining that homeowners often express their frustra-
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 136. XIANFA art. 99, § 2 (1982) (China). 
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problem of credible commitment by allowing the central gov-
ernment to lock in promises to force local governments to rely 
on their own-source revenue. The usual mechanisms for pre-
venting either defaults or bailouts for European and American 
governments are the separation of powers or partisan conflict 
that impedes the central government from taking swift action 
that unravels an earlier bargain.138 Democratic centralism, 
however, poses an ideological obstacle to these conventional so-
lutions. The CCP leadership is unlikely to tolerate the intro-
duction of separate powers in name or in fact.139 In any case, 
the shadow of such conflict in the hidden, internecine fights be-
tween factions within the CCP seems like a thin reed on which 
to hang China’s financial policy.140 
A more promising strategy would be to limit the powers of 
state-owned banks, rather than the central government, by ty-
ing the promotion chances of bank leaders to their track record 
of issuing dubious loans. The Ministry of Finance could require 
municipalities to produce debt-to-property-valuation ratios to 
assess the degree to which outstanding municipal bonds are 
supported by underlying real-estate values. Under this sort of 
precommitment device, officials who extend credit to over-
extended municipalities would be in a disadvantaged position 
vis-à-vis promotion even after moving on to new posts if the 
own-source revenue of the debtor governments proved insuffi-
cient to cover their debts. To strengthen the hand of state-
owned banks, the central government could reassign taxation 
powers from over-indebted municipalities to the banks them-
selves, thereby allowing the latter to impose or maintain local 
taxation levels within those municipalities in proportion to the 
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scope of the likely default.141 The advantage of such a system is 
that it has the possibility of becoming self-enforcing through in-
troduction of an element of competition between lenders and 
local governments, thereby providing the former with an incen-
tive to compete rather than collude with the former.142 On the 
other hand, leaders of state-owned banks are also politicians 
and prone to short-term incentives. To completely overcome the 
short-term incentives requires furthering market-oriented re-
forms in the financial sector.143 
  CONCLUSION   
We are under no illusion that the prescriptions outlined 
above will magically transform Chinese local officials into far-
sighted caretakers of local fiscal responsibility. We suggest only 
that these are examples of the sorts of steps necessary to liber-
ate local officials from the irony of crippling omnipotence, by 
giving them the incentives and capability to make credible 
commitments. Until local officials have the motives and means 
by which to bind themselves and their successors to long-term 
and gradual reforms, those officials will always gamble on in-
vestments that have certain short-term benefits but uncertain 
future costs. Promotion criteria rooted in land values can sup-
ply the motives, while local decision-making processes like 
LPCs can supply the means. By giving each local official the 
power to tie the hands of his or her successor, those processes 
seem to weaken officials. Paradoxically, such limits on power 
make them more powerful, by enabling them to pursue projects 
that transcend the local officials’ short time in office. 
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